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COMMENT
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S POWER
TO SELL REALTY IN VIRGINIA
At common law, tide to personal property passed to an executor or
administrator upon the death of the owner, while tide to realty vested
immediately in the decedent's heirs or devisees.' During the period of
administration, the personal representative's control over personalty was,
and under present law remains, analogous to that of a trustee, there
being few restrictions upon the power to dispose of the property for
the benefit of the estate. With respect to realty, however, a personal
representative at common law had neither tide nor power to sell.
Two general exceptions to the common law rules have evolved to
expand the personal representative's power ovex realty. First, realty
may be subjected by statute to the payment of debts of the estate when
the personalty is insufficient for that purpose. Second, and more sig-
nificantly, an executor may sell realty when vested with such power
by the will.3 This Comment will examine the development and present
status in Virginia of these exceptions to the general rule against sale 'of
realty by a personal representative and will suggest statutory reforms
designed to bring Virginia law more in line with that in other jurisdic-
tions in reflecting modem conditions.
PONER To SELL REALTY FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS
In Virginia, the devisee under a decedent's will, or, if there is no de-
vise, the heir, has title to the real estate from the instant of the de-
cedent's death, with an immediate right to possession and use of the
realty to the extent it is not needed for the payment of the decedent's
debts.- Although at common law the real estate of a decedent passed
1. This distinction represents a vestige of the feudal system of estates, under which
fee to real property reverted to the feudal lord at the death of the feudal tenant.
3 IV. HouswoRTH, Tim HISTORY OF ENGisH LAW 574-76 (1923); 2 F. POLLACK &
F. NMArrL.AND, THE HisToRy OF ENGLISH LAW 334, 360 (2d ed. 1898).
2. In Eppes v. Demoville, 6 Va. (2 Call) 22 (1799), it was stated: "The heir is as
much the legal representative of the testator as to the real estate, as the executor is as
to the personal; and, with the land, the heir takes all deeds, and writings relating to
them, whether for conveying the title or protecting his quiet enjoyment; with none of
which could the executor intermeddle ... "' Id. at 37.
3. T. AnaNsoN, WVu.Ls § 123, at 668 (2d ed. 1953).
4. In some states the real estate is also liable for the expenses of administration of a
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to the heirs or devisees free of all claims of creditors other than those
who had obtained special secured rights against the property during
the decedent's lifetime,- a Virginia statute extends to general creditors
the right to subject a decedent's realty to the payment of debts once
the personalty has been exhausted.7
Statutes in every jurisdiction other than Virginia authorize the per-
sonal representative to sell, under court order, the decedent's realty
to satisfy debts.8 Nevertheless, the Virginia statute has been strictly con-
strued, being in derogation of the common law, to give a personal
representative neither a power of sale nor the right to sue devisees to
compel the sale of realty for the payment of debts. A recent amend-
decedents estate. Although VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-181 (Repl. Vol. 1973) provides that
all real estate of a decedent shall be considered assets for the payment of his debts and
other lawful demands against his estate, it has been held that this provision encompasses
only lawful demands against the decedent, not administration expenses. United States
v. Willcox, 73 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1934); cf. Moore v. Kernachan, 133 Va. 206, 112
S.E. 31 (1922) (costs of administration not debts within the meaning of a provision
in a will directing sale of realty for payment of debts).
5. Alexander v. Byrd, 85 Va. 690, 8 S.E. 577 (1889); Piper v. Douglas, 44 Va. (3
Gratt.) 371 (1847).
6. VA. CoDE ANN. § 64.1-181 (Repl. Vol. 1973) provides:
All real estate of any person who may hereafter die, as to which he may
die intestate, or which, though he die testate, shall not by his will be charged
with or devised subject to the payment of his debts, or which may remain
after satisfying the debts with which it may be so charged or subject to
which it may be so devised, shall be assets for the payment of the de-
cedent's debts and all lawful demands against his estate, in the order in
which the personal estate of a decedent is directed to be applied.
7. Broaddus v. Broaddus, 144 Va. 727, 130 S.E. 794 (1925). As between the real and
personal property of the deceased, the personal estate in the hands of the executor or
administrator is the primary fund for the payment of debts, and, unless there is a
testamentary provision to the contrary, the real estate may not be sold until all the
personal property in the estate has been exhausted. See, e.g., Edmunds v. Scott, 78
Va. 720 (1884). The personal property, without testamentary consent, will not be
exonerated by a charge on the real estate. New's Ex'r v. Bass, 92 Va. 383, 23 SE.
747 (1895).
8. T. AmINSON, supra note 3, § 123, at 670; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 5 14.20,
at 642 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Casner].
9. Peirce v. Graham, 85 Va. 227, 7 S.E. 189 (1888). See also Catron v. Bostic, 123
Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918); Daingerfield v. Smith, 83 Va. 81, 1 S.E. 599 (1887);
Litterall v. Jackson, 80 Va. 604 (1885); Brewis v. Lawson, 76 Va. 36 (1881); McCandlish
v. Keen, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 615 (1857); Tennent v. Patrons, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 196
(1835).
In Catron v. Bostic, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated: "The
creditors have their remedy against the heirs to subject the real estate which is made
assets for the payment of their debts by [section 64.1-181] of the Code, but the
administrator has no such right. The real assets are not subject to be administered at
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mentY° does permit actions against devisees or heirs for the payment
of debts in an amount equivalent to the value of assets received by
descent. Nevertheless, although real assets may be subject to adminis-
tration in a court of equity, including a decree ordering sale pursuant
to a suit by creditors, the statute does not authorize the personal repre-
sentative to sell the assets. Creditors, unable to maintain a direct action
against the personal representative to compel the sale of realty, are
thus left to their traditional remedy of suing the heirs or devisees.
Present Virginia law hinders creditors whose claims exceed the value
of personalty in the estate. Proceeding against heirs or devisees to have
land sold under court decree requires joinder of all takers within the
jurisdiction," with the liability of each limited to a proportionate share
the suit of the administrator of an intestate, in the absence of a statute conferring
such right." The court held that an action could not be maintained by an administrator
who was also a creditor of the deceased and whose bill for sale of the decedent's
land failed to disclose in what capacity suit was brought. Accord, Peirce v. Graham,
supra. The personal representative may neither sue the heirs to have the realty sold
to pay debts nor bring a bill as next friend to the heirs to compel creditors to sell the
realty to pay debts. Although a personal representative is not authorized to maintain
a suit against the heirs to subject realty to the payment of debts, the decree of a
court with jurisdiction of the subject matter, even if erroneous, is binding until
reversed. Id. at 236, 7 S.E. at 194.
10. By adding the words "personal representative," section 64.1-185 was amended to
read as follows:
An heir or devisee may be sued in equity by the personal representative
or any creditor to whom a claim is due for which the estate descended
or devised is liable, or for which the heir or devisee is liable in respect to
such estate; and he shall not be liable to an action at law for any matter
for which there may be redress by such suit in equity. And any judgment
or decree for such claim hereafter rendered against the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent shall be prima facie evidence of the claim against
the heir or devisee in such suit in equity. In any suit by the personal
representative or any creditor pursuant to this chapter, he shall record a
notice of lis pendens as required by § 8-142, at the time of filing such suit.
The personal representative or creditor, as the case may be, shall show to
the satisfaction of the court that there is not sufficient personal assets in
the estate to satisfy all claims against the estate.
VA. CODP, ANN. § 64.1-185 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (emphasis supplied).
Although the amendment may have been intended to give the personal representative
a right to maintain a suit to sell realty for the payment of the decedent's debts, a
strict construction would extend to the personal representative only the right previously
reserved to the decedent's creditors, that is, the right to sue the heir or devisee to
have the land sold under court decree. Although the courts have not yet construed
the amended statute, it appears that the amendment fails to dislodge the prior case law
prohibiting the representative from personally bringing a suit to sell realty for the
payment of debts.
11. A bill filed by a single creditor against the devisees may be converted into a
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'of the debt not to exceed the value of the property received.' 2 The
heir or devisee, moreover, is not accountable for rents or profits accrued
prior to a decree subjecting the realty to the payment of debts.' 3 If
the personal representative had power to pay debts from realty, the
entire procedure for satisfying obligations of the estate could be ex-
pedited, since creditors would need deal with only one party in ad-
justing their claims against the estate.
The efficiency in settlement of claims which results from according
greater power over realty to the personal representative suggests that
the Virginia practice, considered obsolete in most other jurisdictions,'4
should be replaced by a statute authorizing the personal representative
to bring suit to sell the decedent's realty in satisfaction of his debts.
The suggested wording of such a statute is as follows:
When the personal estate of a decedent is insufficient for the
payment of his debts, his personal representative may commence
and prosecute a suit in equity to subject and sell the decedent's real
estate for the payment thereof as provided in this article. The sur-
viving wife or husband, heirs and devisees, if any, and all the
known creditors of the decedent, shall be made defendants in
such suit. If such suit is not brought within a reasonable time
after the qualification of such personal representative, any creditor
of such decedent, whether he has obtained a judgment at law for
his claims or not, may institute and prosecute such suit on behalf
of himself and the other creditors of such decedent, in which the
personal representative, surviving wife or husband, heirs and
devisees, if any, of the decedent shall be defendants. In every suit
under this section anyone claiming to be a creditor of the de-
cedent, whether he may have been made a party thereto or not,
or whether he may have been served vith process therein or not,
general creditor's suit according to the same rules and principles which apply to a bill
filed by a judgment creditor to subject the real estate of a living debtor to the payment
of his judgment. Although not required in either case, the more formal and better
practice is for the plaintiff to file his bill on behalf of himself and other creditors
similarly situated.
12. When one of the devisees has conveyed land to a bona fide purchaser and has
become insolvent, other devisees are liable, not only for the proportionate share each
would have borne in the first instance, but for the entire debt of the decedent, to
the extent of land each received. Ryan's Adm'r v. McLeod, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 367
(1879). If land held by one of the devisees does not discharge his proportionate share
of the debt, the remaining unpaid balance is to be apportioned among the others.
Lewis v. Overby's Adm'r, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 601 (1879).
13. Blow v. Maynard, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 29 (1830).
14. Casner, supra note 8, § 14.20, at 642.
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may present his claim, and, upon such presentation, shall be
deemed to have been made a party to the suit and to have been
served with process therein. And evidence respecting such claim
may be taken, and the same may be allowed and paid, in whole or
in part, or rejected in the same manner and with the same effect,
as if the claimant had been originally made a party and served
with process.r
Under the proposed statute, a creditor would have four remedies:
an action at law against the personal representative upon a judgment
against, or any contract of, the decedent;16 a separate bill in equity
to compel payment of an individual debt from funds in the possession
15. This statute would specifically empower the personal representative to bring suit
against the devisees to sell realty for the payment of debts and thus supersede prior
cases holding to the contrary. It also permits creditors to institute suit if the personal
representative fails to do so within a reasonable time. If, however, the personal repre-
sentative commences a suit before a creditor brings a similar action, the representative's
suit would constitute grounds for staying or dismissing that of the creditor. The
opposite result would obtain if the creditor first commences a suit and the personal
representative has failed to bring suit within a reasonable time after qualifying.
A specific time period might be established during which the personal representative's
right to bring a suit would be exclusive, thus affording him sufficient time in which
to adjust claims without being harassed by other litigants. A West Virginia statute
gives the executor or administrator six months in which to bring suit. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 44-8-7 (1968); see Hess v. Casto, 120 W. Va. 158, 197 S.E. 292 (1938); Tearney v.
Marmion, 103 W. Va. 394, 137 SE. 543 (1927); Gooch v. Gooch, 70 W. Va. 38, 73
SE. 56 (1911); Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 21 W. Va. 76 (1882). Such exclusive time
periods, however, prohibit creditor suits even when the personal representative has
no intention of bringing a suit to subject the realty to the payment of debts. Because
the creditor is concerned with the prompt payment of debts and the running of the
statute of limitations on his claim, an exclusive privilege given an inactive personal
representative may be detrimental to the creditor's interests. By employing the words
"reasonable time," the proposed statute leaves to judicial discretion the option to allow
a creditor to sue immediately upon a showing that the personal representative intends
to remain inactive. An alternate solution is a substitution of the words "a reasonable
time not to exceed six months," thereby placing an outside limit on the time during
which a court may reserve to the personal representative the exclusive privilege of
bringing suit.
An additional advantage of the model statute is that it permits joinder of creditors
even though they were not parties when the suit was filed. Furthermore, there is no
requirement that a creditor have obtained a prior judgment at law for his claims. This
unitary administration of claims clearly would hasten the satisfaction of decedents' debts.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-144 (Repl. Vol. 1973) provides: "A personal representative
may sue or be sued upon any judgment for or against or any contract of or with his
decedent." Coupled with the proposed statute giving the personal representative au-
thority over the realty, this provision would allow the creditor to sue the personal
representative to subject the decedent's real estate to the payment of debts.
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'of the personal representative; 17 a bill on behalf of himself and other
creditors to ascertain and distribute both the real and the personal as-
sets;18 and a bill against the heirs or devisees to compel sale of the real
estate descended to them.19 Enactment of this or a similar statute, while
preserving the creditor's traditional remedies, would resolve uncertain-
ties with respect to the personal representative's authority to dispose of
the decedent's real estate and would bring to the Virginia procedure the
efficiency found in other jurisdictions.
TESTAMENTARY POWER OF SALE
The one clear means by which the personal representative in Virginia
currently may acquire a power of sale over realty is through express
testamentary grant or by assignment of such active duties that the
power is necessarily implied to accomplish the objectives stated in the
will. Such a power may be conferred for a variety of purposes, includ-
ing payment of an allowance to the family, satisfaction of debts out-
standing against the decedent or incurred in the administration of the
estate, or payment of legacies. The power may be general-exer-
cisable "for any and all ends" 20-or limited to a specific purpose
such as the payment of debts."' An examination of the case law in-
terpreting the statutory basis in Virginia22 for a testamentary grant
17. Funds in the hands of the personal representative would include any amount
received pursuant to the sale of realty. The property liable for the payment of debts
would include the decedents realty where his personalty is insufficient, as prescribed
in VA. CODE ANx. S 64.1-181 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
18. Under the proposed statute this remedy is subject to the right of the personal
representative to bring such a suit within a reasonable time after his qualification. See
note 15 supra. When a creditor's suit is instituted, the personal representative would
be a necessary party because of his common law relationship to the personal estate and
his statutory relationship to the real estate.
19. The proposed statute specifically preserves this traditional Virginia remedy. Such
a suit may be brought under authority of VA. CODE ANw. §§ 64.1-181, 64.1-185 (Repl.
Vol. 1973).
20. T. AXINSON, supra note 3, § 123, at 668.
21. Leavell v. Grasty, 114 Va. 763, 77 S.E. 605 (1913). Where real estate was devised
without authority to the executor to encumber it to pay debts, it was held that the ex-
ecutor could sell only so much thereof as was necessary to pay debts, but that he could
not encumber any of the land. Id.
22. The Statute of Wills of 1540 authorized a devise of land to executors or trustees
when instructions for sale and application of the proceeds were given. 32 Hen. VIII,
c. 1 (1540). The Virginia counterpart of this rule appeared in a statute first enacted
in 1785. The statute was amended in 1792 and 1819 and is currently codified as section
64.1-146 of the Virginia Code, which provides: "Real estate devised to be sold shall,
if no person other than the executors be appointed for the purpose, be sold and
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of power to sell realty and establishing the limits, types, and applica-
tion of such powers will indicate a number of the problem areas which
require attention in drafting a will. The desirability of statutory re-
form broader than that already proposed will become apparent.
Present Status in Virginia of the Testamentary Power
Express or Implied Power of Sale
The existence of a testamentary power to sell realty and the extent
of the power conferred depend upon the testator's intent, ascertained
from express language in the will or by implication.23 Although the
difference between express and implied powers is a matter of degree,
the language of the will must provide the basis for either, since a power
of sale will not be found simply because it is desirable. No precise
terminology is necessary to confer upon an executor authority to sell
and dispose of real estate; rather, the intention to create such a power
must be discerned from a reasonable construction of the will as a whole.
"Like any other construction matter the entire scheme of the will, the
nature of the property, the relationship of the beneficiaries, and other
surrounding circumstances must be considered in connection with the
words themselves." 24 Thus, it has been held that a testamentary direc-
tion that realty be sold without an express designation of the executor
as vendor gives rise to an implied power of sale in the executor if the
will authorizes the executor to select the lands to be sold25 or directs
the executor to distribute the proceeds of sale.26 Of course, not every
conveyed and rents and profits of any real estate which executors are authorized by
the will to receive shall be received by the executors who qualify, or the survivor of
them." VA. CoDE ANN. 5 64.1-146 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
23. In Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 855, 128 S.E. 247, 252 (1925), the court observed:
"Executors, by virtue of their office as such, have no power over the real estate. Any
power which they have must be conferred by the will itself, either in terms or by impli-
cation:' See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1952); Annot., 134 A.L.R. 378 (1941).
24. Casner, supra note 8, § 14.28, at 685.
25. Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83 (W.D. Va. 1917), aff'd, 254 F. 379
(4th Cir.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 252 U.S. 569 (1918). The testator's will pro-
vided: "It is my will . .. that all my just debts be paid, . . . all of which debts, costs
and expenses shall be paid out of moneys arising from the sale of any part of my
real estate that my executors may deem most proper to be sold for the above purpose."
Id. at 108-09.
26. See Elys v. Wynne, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 224 (1872), in which the will stated:
[Mly wish is, that the said land shall return to my other heirs, and be sold, and the
moneys arising from such sale to be equally divided among all my heirs." Id. at 230.
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duty involving the sale of realty is sufficient to create a power of sale,27
since it is the intention of the testator as manifested in the will read
as a whole which controls.
When the will confers a power of sale upon the executor, a court
order is unnecessary for its exercise, unless the will by its terms re-
quires prior judicial approval.-2 In some jurisdictions the courts refuse
to grant an order of sale if the executor has power under the wvill to
sell the real estate, on the ground that the judicial proceedings are
an unnecessary expense. 29 The rule in Virginia is more flexible, the
personal representative having the option to seek the assistance of a court
of equity in effecting a sale, such as through a petition for a decree or-
dering sale.30 The objection that such a procedure may be wasteful
of the resources of both court and estate is countered by the fact that
a judicial sale, unlike a private sale authorized in a will, protects the
executor from liability for defects in title.3'
Mandatory or Discretionary Povers
When an executor is commanded to sell realty, the power is manda-
tory; however, a fine line separates such powers from those the exer-
cise of which is discretionary with the executor. The distinction between
27. 2 J. WoERa a, THE A.MEcAN LAW OF ADrMNsRAT ON 1126-27 (3d ed. 1923).
Contra, J. Scioumt, LAw oF Wmus, E cUToas AND ADMINISTRATORS § 2418 (6th ed.
1923).
28. T. ATKINsoN, supra note 3, § 123, at 668.
29. Casner, supra note 8, § 14.28, at 688.
30. Sproul v. Hunter, 122 Va. 102, 109, 94 S.E. 179, 181 (1917); Shepherd v. Darling,
120 Va. 586, 91 S.E. 737 (1917); see Gooch v. Old Dominion Trust Co, 121 Va. 29,
92 S.E. 846 (1917); Terry v. Coles, 80 Va. 695 (1885). See also B. LAmB, VRGINI
PR BATE PRAcrICE §§ 129-33 (1957).
The Uniform Probate Code contains a provision similar to, although stricter than,
the Virginia rule. The Code provides:
Section 3-704. [Personal Representative to Proceed Without Court Order;
Exception.] A personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the
settlement and distribution of a decedents estate and, except as otherwise
specified or ordered in regard to a supervised personal representative, do
so without adjudication, order, or direction of the Court, but he may invoke
the jurisdiction of the Court, in proceedings authorized by this Code, to
resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration.
UNnoam PROBATE CoDE § 3-704. This section emphasizes the expeditious settlement and
distribution of a decedent's estate, permitting resort to judicial proceedings only where
necessary to resolve questions of administration.
31. See Sproul v. Hunter, 122 Va. 102, 109, 94 S.E. 179, 181-82 (1917); Shepherd v.
Darling, 120 Va. 586, 592, 91 S.E. 737, 739 (1917).
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the powers is blurred by such cases as Brown v. Armistead,32 in which
the court, discussing a mandatory power of sale, stated: "[The executors]
were bound to exercise a proper discretion in the matter, bound to use
•all proper means to effect a sale .... ,,3 The provision in question em-
powered the executors to sell the testator's land at public sale if, in their
judgment, the anticipated revenue from such a sale was equal to the
value of the land . 4 Although not explicit on the point, the opinion in
Brown apparently supports the proposition that a testamentary power
to sell realty should be deemed mandatory, notwithstanding that the
exercise of such power is based upon the executor's judgment, if the
testator has set sufficient standards to guide and delimit the exercise of
that judgment.
The above situation is to be distinguished from one in which the ex-
ecutor's decision vis-a-vis sale of realty is not subject to controlling con-
siderations found in the will. The will at issue in another early case, for
example, provided that the executor had full power and authority to
sell a farm five years after the testator's death if it was determined that
the best interests of the testator's family would not be served by the
widow's retention of the realty for a longer period." When, five years
after the testator's death, the executor advertised the farm for sale, the
widow sought an injunction. The court, finding that a power of sale
was present because the testator had given his executor great discretion
in its exercise, stated that such a power could be exceeded only through
fraudulent or improper motive or clear mistake of the executor's duty."'
An executor typically is allowed a reasonable time within which to
exercise his power of sale, reasonableness being determined by market
conditions, the purpose of the sale, and other factors pertinent to the
proper administration of the estate.3 7 Directions to sell realty within a
designated time do not ordinarily prevent a sale thereafter, unless the
will expressly forbids sale beyond a specified date.8 When the power
is mandatory the court may compel the executor to sell within a rea-
sonable time, but if the will directs a sale to be made at a designated
32. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 663 (1828).
33. Id. at 669 (emphasis supplied).
34. Id. at 664.
35. Dixon v. McCue, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 540 (1858).
36. Id. at 548. See Gregory v. Gates, 81 Va. 262 (1885) (provision that executors, if
they believed it would be in the interest of the wife and children, should sell any
of the real and personal estate other than the homestead).
37. Casner, supra note 8, § 14.28, at 688.
38. T. A=Nsom, supra note 3, § 123, at 669.
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future time, or upon the happening of a contingency, a sale before the
prescribed time is void." Finally, if the executor is granted wide discre-
don concerning the time or terms of the sale, he is not liable for any
loss which results from delay in selling the property of the deceased
if he has acted in good faith 40
Power "Coupled with an Interest" or Naked Power
Absent a power of sale created in the will, at common law tide to
realty passed directly to the heirs and devisees.41 Whether a power of
sale alters the devolution of realty in a given case, however, depends
upon construction of the power as "coupled with an interest" or as a
naked power. Virginia courts generally have held that the will transfers
title to the executor when the power of sale is deemed coupled with
an interest,4 or, stated differently, when the testator intended to create
a testamentary trust.43 If only a naked power of sale is conferred, the
39. In Raper v. Sanders, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 60 (1871), the court held that "[w]here
the testator gives an authority or power, upon the happening of an event which he
specifies, that authority or power does not attach from the happening of a different
event, although the effect be the same upon the condition of his estate, or the status
and interests of those who are to be affected by the exercise of the power." Id. at 71.
See Jackson v. Ligon, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 161, 179 (1831), where the will stated: "[Alfter
my wife's death or marriage, my land shall be sold . . . ." The wife renounced the
will, but, because she was still alive and unmarried when the executor sold the land,
the court held that "the sale of the executor, under these circumstances, was not
authorized by the will. Call it a naked power, or a power blended with a trust;
construe it strictly or liberally; still you cannot make it a power to sell the land "
id. at 193.
40. Wimbish v. Rawlins' Ex'r, 76 Va. 48 (1881). The testator, who died in January
1861, desired his debts paid as soon as convenient and directed that his land in Virginia
be sold on such terms as his executor might deem advisable. The executor delayed
sale for almost two years, at which time he received Confederate money for the land,
but was held not accountable for the resulting loss since he had acted in good faith.
41. Broaddus v. Broaddus, 144 Va. 727, 130 SE. 794 (1925).
42. A power coupled with an interest has been defined as a power "coupled with
other trusts and duties which require the execution of the power of sale." Mosby's
Adm'r v. Mosby's Adm'r, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 584, 593 (1853).
43. Upon finding that the executor was vested with a power of sale, the court in
Mills v. Mills, 69 Va. (28 Grat.) 442 (1877) held that "[t]he estate did not devolve
on the heirs for an instant, either at law or in equity, but enured at once to the
executors for the purposes of the will." Id. at 460. In Kellow v. Bumgardner, 196 Va.
247, 83 S.E.2d 391 (1954), it was held that where a nonresident testator by will created
various trusts in the residuum of his estate and gave executors and trustees full power
to sell and convey his realty, the powers, interests, rights, and duties relative to the
testator's realty in Virginia devolved upon the administrator c.t.a. In Coles'
Heirs v. Jamerson, 112 Va. 311, 71 S.E. 618 (1911), however, a direction in a
will that land be sold by executors was held to give them only a power of sale, and
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land descends to the heir or passes to the devisee under the 'will, en-
titling either to use the property until the executor or the trustee exe-
cutes the power.44
A starting point for distinguishing a power coupled with an interest
from a naked power is the general proposition that "[t]he power is
commonly said to be 'coupled with an interest' if the estate as well as
the power is in the donee." 45 Thus, an express devise of realty to the
executor with instructions to sell clearly grants a power coupled with
an interest.46 On the other hand, it is equally clear that only a naked
power is conferred when realty is devised to a named beneficiary ex-
pressly authorized to take possession subject to the debts of the testator
or to the payment of legacies. 47 When, however, the testator makes no
devise of his realty but authorizes the executor to sell it and distribute
the proceeds to a designated beneficiary, or when the realty is devised
to one beneficiary but the executor is authorized to sell it and dis-
tribute the proceeds among various beneficiaries, including or excluding
the devisee, there is scant precedent in Virginia classifying the nature
of the interests conferred.
One early case is indicative of an apparent inclination of Virginia
courts to find an executor's power of sale coupled with an interest.
In Mosby's Administrator v. Mosby's Administrator,"8 a will instructed
the executors in their discretion to sell specified undevised portions of
the testator's land and distribute the proceeds to certain beneficiaries.
Noting that the intent of the testator determines whether a power of
sale is "coupled with an interest" and considering the will as a whole
no interest in the land; title to the land devolves upon the heirs upon the death of the
testator, subject to divestiture only by the lawful execution of the power of sale.
44. Machir v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 286, 18 S.E. 197, 199 (1893).
45. Evans, The Survival of Powers of Joint Executors to Sell Land, 85 U. PA. L. REv.
154, 162 (1936).
46. S. CQoswau, Tim LAw OF ExEcUToRs AND ADMINIsTRATORs § 330 (1889) observes:
"It is said to be now settled that if the land is devised to the executor to sell .. . this
passes the interest in the lands to the executor... ." See Coles' Heirs v. Jamerson, 112
Va. 311, 316, 71 SE. 618, 619-20 (1911).
47. In Machir v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 18 S.E. 197 (1893), the will provided that "[all
the rest and residue of my estate shall be sold after my death by my executors here-
inafter named, and, after paying all my just debts and the legacies aforesaid, the
residue, if any, I give to Mary Ellen Jamison." Id. at 286, 18 S.E. at 198. The court,
in construing this provision, concluded that "although the will directs it to be sold
by the executors, the obvious intention was to confer on the executors a naked power."
Id. at 288, 18 S.. at 199. See also Elys v. Wynne, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 224 (1872) (naked
power where executors had authority to sell realty devised to testators heirs).
48. 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 584 (1853).
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
together with the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution,
the court reasoned as follows in concluding that the testator intended
to pass title to his executors:
The testator obviously did not design that until a sale of the land
it should devolve on his heirs. He intended to break the de-
scent .... He did not expect the devisees to hold any of the
property jointly, but intended that all of it should be divided, and
they should receive their several portions. The land he intended
should, be divided not in ldnd... but by a sale and division of
the proceeds .... He seems to have contemplated, as a matter of
course, that his executors would hold all ....49
Mosby's Administrator aligns with the common law rule providing
for the imposition of a trust when the active testamentary dudes im-
posed on the executor are such that granting him legal tide is reason-
ably necessary to accomplish the avowed purposes of the will and when
the trust thus implied sustains, rather than defeats, the disposition made
in the will. ° Virginia courts, it is submitted, are likely to apply such a
rule in the future unless the will clearly shows the testator's contrary
intent, since imposing a trust in the executor pending sale of the realty
profits the beneficiaries and the estate by encouraging efficiency of ad-
ministration and maximizing the sale price.
Whether the executor has a right to possession of the realty generally
is governed by the same considerations determinative of legal title; that
is, absent an express grant,51 the executor has no right to possession of
realty unless an implied grant may be found in the terms of the will.
As with title to realty, an implied right to possession may be founded
upon the existence of a power of sale coupled with an interest. 2 Since
it has been held that an executor who holds legal title has a right to
49. Id. at 594-96. See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1140, 1143-46 (1935). See also Brockenbrough
v. Turner, 78 Va. 438 (1884) (will directing that land not specifically devised be sold
by the executor for payment of debts and legacies held to vest legal title to the land
in the executor).
50. Annot., 134 A.L.R. 378 (1941); see Annot., 23 AJ.,.R.2d 1000 (1952); 54 Ai. JUR.
Trusts § 65 (1945).
51. An executor is entitled to possession of real estate charged by the will with the
payment of debts, regardless of whether personalty is sufficient for such payment.
Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 172 (1854).
52. It should be noted, however, that the power to take possession of real estate and
the power to sell it are two entirely distinct powers, either of which may be conferred
or exercised without reference to the other.
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possession, 3 it appears that title is determinative of possessory rights
when the will is silent on the point.5 4
Title Conveyed
If the power of sale is properly exercised by the personal representa-
tive, he conveys good tide to his grantee. An attempted exercise
beyond the scope of the power granted or by an unauthorized person,
however, passes no tide, since a purchaser has a duty to inquire into
the sufficiency of the testator's title and the authority of the executor
to sell under the will.m Nevertheless, a conveyance is not subject to
attack simply because the executor was acting in violation of his trust
if the purchaser had no knowledge of such violation and in good faith
paid the purchase price. 6 An executor selling land under a testamentary
53. Mosby's Adm'r v. Mosby's Adm'r, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 584 (1853).
54. If the executor in possession holds title under a testamentary trust, the beneficiaries
are entitled to the rents accruing before sale of the land. Id. at 595.
55. In Brock v. Philips, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 68, 70 (1795), it was held: "The executor
by law has a right to the possession ... of personal estate, and a right to sell [it]. But
he has no right to sell lands, unless under a special authority. A purchaser therefore of
land, from an executor, is bound to look for, and to understand the extent of that
power, and consequently the [principle of] caveat emptor strictly applies in such a
case." See Syme v. Johnson, 7 Va. (3 Call) 558 (1790) (where the executor stated at
the sale that he sold only as his testator, held: it was the duty of the purchaser to
inquire into the state of the property).
56. Staples v. Staples, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 225 (1874); Moss v. Moorman, 65 Va. (24
Gratt.) 97 (1873). See also Brockenbrough v. Turner, 78 Va. 438 (1884). In accord-
ance with the general rule, the Uniform Probate Code provides:
Section 3-714. [Persons Dealing with Personal Representative; Protection.]
A person who in good faith either assists a personal representative or
deals with him for value is protected as if the personal representative prop-
erly exercised his power. The fact that a person knowingly deals with a
personal representative does not alone require the person to inquire into
the existence of a power or of the propriety of its exercise. Except for
restrictions on powers of supervised personal representatives which are
endorsed on letters as provided in Section 3-504, no provision in any will
or court order purporting to limit the power of a personal representative
is effective except as to persons with actual knowledge thereof. A person
is not bound to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or de-
livered to a personal representative. The protection here expressed extends
to instances in which some procedural irregularity or jurisdictional defect
occurred in proceedings leading to the issuance of letters, including a case
in which the alleged decedent is found to be alive. The protection here
expressed is not by substitution for that provided by comparable provisions
of the laws relating to commercial transactions and laws simplifying trans-
fers of securities by fiduciaries.
U FOaM PRO13ATE CODE 5 3-714.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
power is bound to convey with only a special warranty against him-
self and all persons claiming under him,57 and a purchaser who takes
no covenants against defects of title is without relief, unless, of course,
the personal representative has been guilty of such fraud as will vitiate
the contract.
If an executor is given a discretionary power of sale, a purchaser,
acting in good faith, is unaffected by the manner in which the executor
exercises that discretion. In Davis v. Christian,5 8 for example, the court
held that "[ilt was not the duty or business of the purchaser to inquire
into the necessity or expediency of the sale .... He had a right to pre-
sume, in the absence of all direct or plain proof to the contrary, that
the executor was exercising his power fairly and faithfully, in conformity
with his duty."59 Moreover, the purchaser is not obligated to ensure
proper application by the executor of the proceeds of the sale.°0
Survival of a Power among Joint Executors
Even when the language of a will clearly creates a power of sale,
questions remain if such power is vested in joint executors. Unless
some basis for the survival of the power can be found,"' a sale by
fewer than all executors is void. Determining whether a power sur-
57. Grantland v. Wight, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 295 (1816) (executor not bound to convey
with covenant of general warranty, notvithstanding a written agreement, after the sale,
that he would make "a good and indefeasible title" to the purchaser, because such agree-
ment is to be understood in reference to the terms of the sale). See also Pennington v.
Hanby, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 140 (1813).
58. 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 11 (1859).
59. Id. at 50.
60. Id. See Brockenbrough v. Turner, 78 Va. 438 (1884); Meeks' Adm'r v. Thompson,
49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 134 (1851). Section 3-714 of the Uniform Probate Code adopts the
same rule. Of course, an executor will be compelled to account for the proceeds of
real estate sold by him pursuant to the directions of the will. Nimmo's Ex'r v. Com-
monwealth, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 57 (1809).
61. See Deneale v. Morgan, 9 Va. (5 Call) 407 (1805); Johnston v. Thompson, 9 Va.
(5 Call) 248 (1804). Where one of several executors refuses to qualify, a conveyance
by the others named in the will is justified. Geddy v. Butler, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 345
(1811). Where fewer than all the executors convey the real estate, the invalid sale
can be ratified by the other executors and the title to the purchaser validated. See
Mills v. Mills, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 442 (1877); Nelson v. Carrington, 18 Va. (4 Munf.)
332 (1814).
62. Rae v. Farrow, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 444 (1809) (conveyance by two of three
qualified executors not valid in law). But see Roberts v. Stanton, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 129
(1810) (conveyance by one of three executors validated by court of equity).
Although the Uniform Probate Code supports the general rule, it has delineated a
number of situations in which joint action is not required:
Section 3-717. [Co-representatives; When Joint Action Required.] If two
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vives among joint executors, however, is a problem which has long
engaged the attention of the courts, legislatures, and writers.63
Because the power of sale survives only if it is attached to the
office, rather than to the person, of an executor,6 4 survival generally
is not permitted when the power is expressly made joint among desig-
nated individuals.a Moreover, although a discretionary power to sell
realty is less likely to survive than is a mandatory power, mere dis-
cretion is not fatal to the survival of a power.06
At early common law, a distinction was made between naked powers
and those coupled with an interest, survival being permitted only in
the latter case. 7 To prevent some of the designated joint executors
from frustrating the testator's intent merely by refusing to qualify,
thereby precluding sale by the qualified executors, later common law"'
or more persons are appointed co-representatives and unless the will pro-
vides otherwise, the concurrence of all is required on all acts connected
with the administration and distribution of the estate. This restriction does
not apply when any co-representative receives and receipts for property
due the estate, when the concurrence of all cannot readily be obtained in
the time reasonably available for emergency action necessary to preserve
the estate, or when a co-representative has been delegated to act for the
others. Persons dealing with a co-representative if actually unaware that
another has been appointed to serve with him or if advised by the personal
representative with whom they deal that he has authority to act alone for
any of the reasons mentioned herein, are as fully protected as if the person
with whom they dealt had been the sole personal representative.
UNwouR PRO3ATE CODE § 3-717. It is submitted that the exceptions for emergency
action, delegation of powers, and the protection of bona fide purchasers are reasonable
and merit the attention of courts which oversee the administration of estates.
63. See Hofheimer v. Seaboard Citizens Nael Bank, 154 Va. 896, 156 S.E. 581 (1931);
Shepherd v. Darling, 120 Va. 586, 91 S.E. 737 (1917). See also Evans, The Survival of
Powcrs of Joint Executors To Sell Land, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 154 (1936); Kales, Survival
of Powers as Unaffected by Statutes, 6 ILL. L. REv. 447 (1912); 2 J. WOERNER, supra
note 27, at 1126-39.
64. Casner, supra note 8, § 14.28, at 691.
65. Davis v. Christian, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 11 (1859).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-142 (Repl. Vol. 1973) provides:
When discretionary powers are conferred upon the executors of any will
heretofore or hereafter executed and some but not all of such executors
die, resign or become incapable of acting, the executors or executor re-
maining shall thereafter exercise the discretionary powers given in such
will, unless it be expressly provided in such will that the discretionary
powers cannot be exercised by any number less than all of the original
executors named.
See also Davis v. Christian, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 11 (1859).
67. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 826 (1925).
68. 21 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1529).
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and a present Virginia statute69 provide for survival of naked powers
as well as those coupled with an interest.
In view of the uncertainty engendered by the concept of survival
among joint executors, it may be argued that survivorship should be
permitted in all cases unless expressly restricted by the will.70 Neverthe-
less, it is submitted that the intent of testators would be better served
by restricting survival to those instances in which the power conferred
evidences no reliance upon the personal qualifications of the named
executors.
Administrator c.t.a.71
Assuming that a will confers upon the executor a power to sell realty,
the question arises, upon an executor's failure to qualify or the termina-
tion of his appointment, whether the testamentary power may be ex-
ercised by an administrator with the will annexed. Permitting exercise
of a power of sale by an administrator c.t.a. is not supported by the
arguments in favor of such exercise by one or more of several execu-
tors, for, in the former case, the testator has expressed no confidence
in the appointed administrator. It is generally held, therefore, in the
absence of a statute or express provision in the will, that an adminis-
trator c.t.a. may not exercise a testamentary power 'of sale.72 The op-
posite rule is laid down by statute in Virginia, that is, the administrator
c.t.a. may generally exercise a mandatory or discretionary power of
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-146 (Repl. Vol. 1973). See also Brown v. Armistead,
27 Va. (6 Rand.) 594, 665-66 (1828).
70. The Uniform Probate Code permits survival in every case unless it would be
contrary to the testator's intent as expressed in the will. This is based upon the
questionable assumption that the decedent would not consider the powers of his ex-
ecutors personal. The Code provides:
Section 3-718. [Powers of Surviving Personal Representative.] Unless the
terms of the will otherwise provide, every power exercisable by personal
co-representatives may be exercised by the one or more remaining after
the appointment of one or more is terminated, and if one of 2 or more
nominated as co-executors is not appointed, those appointed may exercise
all the powers incident to the office.
UMnO M PROBATE CODE § 3-718.
71. An administrator with the will annexed (curn testanzento annexo) is judicially
appointed either when no executor was named or when the sole surviving named
executor dies, is incompetent, or refuses to act.
72. Career, supra note 8, § 14.28, at 692. In such case, however, a court of equity




sale.73 An exception to this rule operates to deny such power to the
administrator c.t.a. when it appears that the testator manifested par-
ticular confidence in the named executor and would not have wished
that the power be exercised by a successor.74 It has been suggested that
when a testator creates a power of sale coupled with an interest and
indicates his confidence and trust in the individual recipient of the power,
the administrator c.t.a. is without authority to exercise the power.
73. VA. CODE AN. § 64.1-147 (RepI. Vol. 1973) provides:
When any will heretofore or hereafter executed gives to the executor or
executors named therein power to sell the testator's real estate and such
executor or executors die, resign or become incapable of acting and an
administrator or administrators with the will annexed are appointed,
such administrator or administrators with the will annexed may sell such
real estate unless it is expressly provided to the contrary in such will.
In addition, the last sentence in Virginia Code section 64.1-146 provides that "the
administrator with the will annexed shall sell or convey the lands ... devised to be
sold . . . as an executor might have done." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-146 (Repl. Vol.
1973). Id. § 64.1-142 provides:
When discretionary powers are conferred upon the executors of any will
heretofore or hereafter executed and all the executors named in such will
die, resign or become incapable of acting, or when there is only one executor
named and such sole executor dies, resigns or become incapable of acting,
then in such event the administrators with the will annexed or administrator
with the will annexed appointed by the court shall exercise the discretionary
powers vested in the original executors or executor, unless the discretionary
powers in such will are by express language limited or restricted to the
executors or executor named therein.
In Mosby's Adm'r v. Mosby's Adm'r, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 584 (1853), the court stated:
[Tihe administrator with the will annexed was authorized to sell and
convey the land; and being authorized to do that, he was authorized to hold
the land and receive the rents and profits until the sale. The will created
but one trust in regard to the land .... This entire trust devolved on the
executors during the existence of their authority; and must, if any part of
it, devolve on the administrator with the will annexed, not having been
completed by the executors, and their authority having ceased. . . .The
statute [section 64.1-146] having expressly conferred on the administrator
with the will annexed the principal power to sell and convey embraced in
the trust created by the will, the power to hold and rent out the land in
the mean time, embraced in the same trust, would seem to pass as a mere
incident to the former.
Id. at 600; cf. Cole' Heirs v. Jamerson, 112 Va. 311, 71 SE. 618 (1911) (An ad-
ministrator without the will annexed does not succeed to the powers of the executor
with reference to sale of the estate.). An administrator c.t.a. has been held to be
without right to exercise a power of sale conferred by the will when he was a
major creditor of the testator and attempted to sell realty charged by the will with
the payment of debts but previously conveyed without consideration to the testators
devisee. Watson v. Fletcher, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 1 (1850).
74. VA. CoDE ANN. § 64.1-147 (RepL Vol. 1973). The Uniform Probate Code is in
accord with the Virginia general rule and the exception thereto: "Section 3-716.
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On this basis, it is argued that an administrator c.t.a. should be able
to exercise only a naked power of sale.rs In Virginia, nevertheless, it is
clear that an administrator with the will annexed may exercise a power
coupled with an interest."
The Necessity of a Clearly Drafted Will
Due in large part to, the unnecessarily complicated melange of
judicial doctrine with respect to a personal representative's testamentary
power to sell realty, there is a particular necessity in Virginia for a
clearly drafted will. Much of the frustration of a testator's intent which
results when courts attempt to infer meaning from imprecise language
can be avoided simply by foreseeing the likely areas of confusion con-
cerning the authority of the personal representative prior to the time
a will is executed.
Before drafting any will, an attorney should ascertain whether the
testator wishes his executor to assume the responsibility of caring for
real as well as personal property. Should the testator so desire, the will
should grant the executor express authority and provide guidance
for all actions necessary to take possession, manage, encumber, and
sell the real estate. If the testator desires that the executor have a power
of sale over the realty, the will should delineate the parameters of the
executor's authority, including the specific realty subject to the power
and the purposes for which there may be a sale. Furthermore, the will
should specify whether the nature of the power is mandatory or dis-
cretionary, whether the executor is to have tide and possession prior
to sale, whether the power of joint executors survives, and whether
the power is exercisable only by the named executor.
In addition, the will should specify whether the executor may pur-
chase the land himself. Inasmuch as the prevailing law precludes pur-
chase by a fiduciary at his own sale, whatever the fairness of the trans-
[Powers and Duties of Successor Personal Representative.] A successor personal repre-
sentative has the same power and duty as the original personal representative to com-
plete the administration and distribution of the estate, as expeditiously as possible, but
he shall not exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in
the will." UNnrotaR PROBATE CODE § 3-716.
75. Annot., 116 A.L.R. 158 (1938). In Brown v. Armistead, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 663
(1828), the court, after finding that the executors were given a mere naked power to
sell, held that the administrator c.t.a. had the power to sell, stating: "The executors
were mere instruments for effecting this purpose. . . . [No] peculiar personal confi-
dence is reposed in them." Id. at 669.
76. See note 73 supra.
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action,77 an executor with power to, sell realty cannot purchase the
lands directly or indirectly unless the testator clearly provides the
authority to do so in the will.78 A purchase by the executor, neverthe-
less, is not void, but merely voidable at the option of the party bene-
ficially interested. Such a rule protects the beneficiaries against a breach
of fiduciary obligations while reserving to the executor the opportunity
to purchase from the estate if the beneficiaries forego their right to
avoid the sale.70 Even if the sale is voided by the beneficiaries, however,
the executor may yet receive title if, after the initial attempted pur-
chase, a higher purchase price cannot be obtained at a second sale. 0 An
express provision in the will specifying the executor's authority to pur-
chase realty from the estate would obviate any problems in this area.
One further item which should be addressed in drafting a will is the
type of sale the executor may conduct to dispose 'of the realty. Ac-
cording to the prevailing rule, a power to sell realty conferred upon
the executor which fails to direct whether the sale should be public or
77. Smith v. Miller, 98 Va. 535, 37 S.. 10 (1900); Harrison v. Manson, 95 Va. 593,
29 SE. 420 (1898); Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S.E. 397 (1896); Davies v. Hughes,
86 Va. 909, 11 SE. 488 (1890); Howery v. Helms, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 1 (1870); Bailey v.
Robinsons, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 4 (1844); Buckles v. Lafferty, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 307 (1843);
Moore v. Hilton, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 1 (1841). The earlier rule was that an executor
could purchase at his own sale as long as it did not violate the will of the testator
and it appeared that his conduct at the sale was fair and correct. Earlier decisions
reasoned that the practice was so common in Virginia that to hold otherwise would
operate to render voidable the title to a great amount of property. See McKey v.
Young, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 430 (1809).
78. Although an executor may not lawfully, directly or indirectly, purchase at his
own sale, it has been held that he may purchase for his own benefit property previ-
ously purchased by his vendor from himself as executor provided that the transaction
is real and bona fide. Wayland v. Crank, 79 Va. 602 (1884); Hurt v. Jones, 72 Va. 341
(1881); Staples v. Staples, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 225 (1874).
79. The Uniform Probate Code states:
Section 3-713. (Sale, Encumbrance or Transaction Involving Conflict of
Interest; Voidable: Exceptions.] Any sale or encumbrance to the per-
sonal representative, his spouse, agent or attorney, or any corporation or
trust in which he has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction
which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the
personal representative, is voidable by any person interested in the estate
except one who has consented after fair disclosure, unless
(1) the will or a contract entered into by the decedent ex-
pressly authorized the transaction; or
(2) the transaction is approved by the Court after notice to
interested persons.
UNIFoni PROBATE CoDE § 3-713. Note that the Code gives the right to void the
sale to any person interested in the estate but permits court approval of a voidable sale.
80. Bailey v. Robinsons, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 4 (1844).
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private authorizes the executor to select the method which, in his judg-
ment, will yield the better price."' If the testator authorizes a private
sale, provison for notice to parties interested in the estate might be in-
cluded to afford opportunity for timely objection to the terms upon
which the property is to be disposed.
A PROPOSED STATUTE
A statute has already been suggested to permit satisfaction of the
testator's debts without the necessity for individual creditor suits against
heirs or devisees. It is submitted that administration of estates in Virginia
would be enhanced by enactment of a broader provision giving the per-
sonal representative the same powers and duties over realty that he
presently has over personalty. Whatever the historical necessity of
protecting devisees and heirs by restricting the authority of the per-
sonal representative over realty,82 the present trend in other jurisdictions
is to vest in the personal representative the same powers in trust over
both real and personal assets of the estate.83
An effective statute should delineate the circumstances under which
a sale may be made in the absence of a testamentary power and pro-
81. Moss v. Moorman, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 97 (1873).
82. One author has suggested that the powers of a personal representative may have
been limited to protect the heirs and devisees from his bad judgment. Word, Updating
Virginia's Probate Law, 4 U. Ricu. L. REv. 223, 226 (1970).
83. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-711 and 3-715 provide as follows:
Section 3-711. [Powers of Personal Representatives; In General.] Until
termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same
power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would
have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested
in the estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order
of court.
Section 3-715. [Transactions Authorized for Personal Representatives;
Exceptions.] Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by
an order in a formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in
Section 3-902, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of
the interested persons, may properly
(6) acquire or dispose of an asset, including land in this or
another state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale; and
manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the
character of, or abandon an estate asset...
(23) sell, mortgage, or lease any real or personal property
of the estate or any interest therein for cash, credit, or for part
cash and part credit, and with or without security for unpaid
balances ....
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vide a means to obtain judicial approval of a proposed sale. Such a
statute might be worded as follows:
When a sale of the property is necessary to pay the allowance
of the family, or the debts outstanding against the decedent, or
the debts, expenses, or charges of administration, or legacies; or
when it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the
advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate, and those in-
terested therein, including the minor heirs, if any, that the real
estate, or some part thereof, be sold, or that said sale would allevi-
ate expense or hardship to, or be to the best financial interest of,
the estate or those interested in the estate, including the minor heirs,
if any, or if all heirs petition for such sale, the personal repre-
sentative may sell any real as well as personal property of the
estate, upon the order of the court.
A statute of this type would authorize the personal representative
to petition a court for permission to sell realty and cause tide and
possession to vest in trust in the personal representative upon the
court's decree pending sale. The personal representative could satisfy
the obligations of the estate from the decedent's real and personal
property, thus eliminating the necessity of suing the heirs or devisees to
subject the realty to sale.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between realty and personalty which persists in the
law governing administration of estates in Virginia is based upon a
concept of real property as the foundation of private wealth-a concept
not in harmony with modem economic and social realities. Efficient
administration requires that someone preserve and manage a decedent's
real estate immediately after his death and prior to administration, and
the personal representative is a logical repository of such powers. If a
sale of the realty is necessary to satisfy creditors' claims or otherwise to
serve the interests of the estate, the personal representative should have
the power to sell realty. Under present Virginia law, however, a "per-
sonal representative may be hamstrung by lack of administrative powers,
absent a well-drawn will." s4 It is submitted that the settlement of de-
cedents' estates could be greatly facilitated if the distinctions between the
power of personal representatives to sell real and personal property were
obliterated.
84. Word, supra note 82, at 226.
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